This article seeks to conceptualise a more public, a more socialised notion of privacy in contrast to the archetype: that my privacy is of interest and of value only to me. Doing so has historically left a claim to privacy rather exposed against claims to free speech, with the latter's long pedigree and generally acknowledged wider instrumental role. This article provides a corrective. In the first part, it offers a typology of rationales at one of two meta-levels: privacy as a means to effect assurance or privacy as a means to protect someone's activities. The second discusses the results of some small-scale empirical doctrinal research: a sample analysis of 27 UK privacy cases looking to identify the judicial ascription of the value of privacy, specifically trying to discover whether there was any judicial conceptualising of privacy as having a more social, or public, value or utility. The results are perhaps not unexpected. Almost exclusively, judges frame their rationales for protecting privacy in purely individualised terms.
I. INTRODUCTION
The mantra of hi-tech company The Circle, in Dave Eggars' novel of the same name, is that which includes a voting app -as a means of securing 100% democratic participation, an obviously Good Thing. Literature has a long history of dystopias along those or similar lines -and some foresee real life following a similar trajectory. Eggars wants us to baulk at these suggestions, and to jolt ourselves awake -we should indeed be wary given the almost imperceptible incrementalism involved in a project such as The Circle's. We do so because we value privacy -our own privacy. We do not see it as serving instrumental goals, even if they might be as socially beneficial as The Circle is trying to claim (but which readers of course doubt).
This article seeks to provide a corrective to both those last contentions. While we each might value our own privacy, and indeed may well value it highly, that leaves claims to an individualised right of privacy rather exposed against claims to a socialised right of free speech, with its long pedigree and generally acknowledged wider instrumental role. This is problematic. It has the effect of The article is in three main parts. The first sets out what we might call the traditional debate. It notes the public utility of free speech and the individualised nature of justifications for protecting privacy. The second then offers a typology of rationales that we might pray in aid were we to seek to construct a more socialised notion of privacy, that is privacy with social value or utility. Whilst in general that sites our debate around privacy's common value, using Priscilla Regan's three-fold categorisation 2 , we will also consider elements of what she termed privacy's public value, instrumentally pertaining to the civic, democratic and political sphere (and the opposite of the private realm of family, home and workplace). The last part of this article provides the results of some small-scale 4
II. THE PARADIGMATIC FRAMEWORK
Traditionally viewed, privacy is important for individuals while free speech has wider, social functions. It is well established and unassailable that my privacy is of enormous benefit and value to me. Historically, privacy has been seen as being about harm to dignity, dating back to the original legal articulation in the late 1800s by Warren and Brandeis 10 , and to autonomy: dignity because publishing stories about my private life treats me as a means (to the publisher's profits and its readers' enjoyment) not as an end in myself -and autonomy, since it removes my right either to choose to release information about myself or to retain control such that information that I had not chosen to release or information over which I had asserted control (or over which I had limited the release, in terms of audience or details) becomes known. We see this realised in Campbell, with Lord Hoffman
asserting that 'what human rights law has done is to identify private information as something worth protecting as an aspect of human autonomy and dignity.'
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Lord Nicholls put it like this: a 'proper degree of privacy is essential for the wellbeing and development of an individual.' 12 Protecting privacy also assists us in maintaining our self-esteem and securing personal dominium. 13 In his dissent in . 15 We might even consider those non-consequentialist justifications as being both individual or collectivist -the latter that they speak to shared human traits, such as empathy or in the JudeoChristian tradition 'Judge not, that ye be not judged' (Matthew 7:1).
articulation, Neil Richards and Daniel Solove make that very point. 'Their central phrase to describe the right to privacy--the right to be let alone--emphasizes the isolated individual and her ability to shut out invaders.' 16 The contrast with free speech is immediately and obviously instructive. Most obvious in this context would be the role that it plays within a political democracy -aiding the development of an informed electorate and self-governing citizenry, the view advanced by Alexander Meiklejohn 17 , or acting as a brake on power. 18 This idea of truth as disinfectant best reflects the fictional urging of politicians to wear The
Circle's SeeChange device. Alternatively, freedom of expression might bring about the social good of (better) truth in the market place of ideas. As Justice
Holmes put it in his dissent in Abrams 'the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.' 19 Free speech might also be imbued with the quality of 'social glue', drawing on Joseph Raz's idea about the validating function of public portrayals of lifestyles. 20 They not only 'serve to reassure those whose ways of life are being portrayed that they are not alone' but 'they serve to familiarize the public at large with ways of life common in certain segments of the public'. Such portrayals, made real by the guarantee of free speech, thus serve a social function, that of community cohesion, perhaps not dissimilar to Lee Bollinger's notion of free speech inculcating reciprocal tolerance.
21
Each is now simply accepted judicially and theoretically as orthodoxyjustification for the claim that free speech does indeed promote social harmony or does lead to falsity being hounded out of the market is never sought. Constructed thus -if privacy is something 'simply' of value only to me, as the means to effect my autonomy and guarantee my dignity -one does not have to be a utilitarian to recognise the difficulty that faces anyone seeking to prevent the media claiming 6 to be entitled to publish material about them. If however, we reconfigure privacy as something valued for its social utility -for the role it may play more widely, for the enhancements and benefits it can offer each of us collectively -then the relationship alters dramatically. It is to that we now turn. While all the various rationales outlined below serve instrumental functions, we might better typify them as working at one of two meta-levels: effecting assurance or protecting activity. 25 We mean by the former that the very act of protecting A's privacy per se has social significance, irrespective of whatever it is that A is said to have done. There is a gain for X Y and Z etc simply from knowing that A's privacy in the abstract is or will be protected. Rules that mean we are unable to pry into our neighbour's affairs -literal or figurative -in one sense are thus both the cost, as well as the benefit, of one form of political organisation. In Rawlsian terms, we might see rules that guarantee privacy as the price we pay to reduce the strains of commitment, something that encourages us all to 'buy' into the social contract. 29 We might term this co-optive privacy.
III. THE SOCIAL UTILITY OF PRIVACY

9
A guarantee of privacy simpliciter -that is, aside from any shroud it offers to the private activity -performs a normative structuralising function, what we might consider to be norm-inculcating privacy. Rules assuring us that our privacy will be protected very clearly set out public limitations on the actions of third parties, whether governmental and other private actors. The very act of hiving off aspects of one's existence -and denoting them as private, as beyond the reach of any other -is itself thus a socially significant act. This is the sense in which Priscilla
Regan sees privacy. 30 For Paul Schwartz, the delineation of (informational) This in turn has a socially instrumental value. We place in the background and in private those aspects that separate us from others allowing us in the public, civic realm to foreground that which unites us -rather than being constantly driven apart by public differences -thus confirming our equal status as citizens.
40
Another means by which privacy-protection rules provide a social surety function is one we might term meritocratic privacy -the assurance we all have, as I put it in an earlier piece, 'that those seeking appointment to public positions will not be deterred from putting themselves forward solely because of the fear the media 34 The idea of 'constitutive privacy' is raised in P Schwartz, 'Privacy and Democracy' (n31) 1658 To be sure, some kinds of privacy claims-like the paradigmatic
Warren and Brandeis claim against the press based upon hurt feelings-do threaten First Amendment values, in this case the need to protect the institution of the press so that it can provide information of public concern.
49
That may well be true but is far too narrow a formulation. There are two points to make. Whilst it is hard to imagine a case where, if the press is prevented from publishing private information (or even, simply, seeking to gather it), that could not be said to have constrained (in US terms) the First Amendment rights of the press, does it follow then that public discourse more widely is impoverished? As we shall see, being able to protect private information from public disclosure allows individual flourishing to which we can quite properly attribute speech gains, either through wider or 'better' speech. One would be Richards' own case that ideas are properly thought through before being expressed. Another would be the idea that anonymity -on the internet but we could think of it more generally -allows us to hear views from certain marginalised or insecure groups otherwise denied us:
whistleblowers and victims of abuse would be two that spring to mind. Secondly, even if it we were to accept the case that privacy against media intrusion reduces our collective enjoyment of freedom of expression by limiting freedom of the press, that does not mean that preventing the public disclosure of private information cannot make more secure or more effective the exercise of other rights by others.
We might term this facilitative privacy. Privacy not only allows each of us individually, and then collectively, fuller exercise of the rights of free speech and of thoughts and belief (if we accept the first counter above), but it also allows a fuller exercise of the rights to assemble and associate -and thus aids political plurality.
One such means is that by privileging private communications, it facilitates unorthodox groups in organising. 50 Further, by affording us the right to retain control over our private information, it can assist in securing rights of equal treatment by shrouding (certain) personal characteristics, publication of which -or in Rawlsian terms, lifting the veil of ignorance -might mean we suffer discrimination or differential treatment.
51
Closely linked to this is another socially-valuable outcome: innovative privacy, privacy here acting as the guarantor of, as Julie Cohen saw it, the freedom to tinker.
52
Privacy shelters dynamic, emergent subjectivity from the efforts of commercial and government actors to render individuals and communities fixed, transparent, and predictable. 53 We need here to think of the work of Ruth Gavison 54 , and also of Edmund Kitch's prospect theory in relation to intellectual property. 55 It is not simply free speech that might be facilitated by an effective guarantee of privacy but experimentation, Swain for making me aware of this latter work. 51 The rejoinder is that it does not in fact do so, but instead achieves false equality based on a public lie. All this in turn posits a tension with one of the social functions of privacy that we identified earlier, innovative privacy. On one hand, the argument being made here is that privacy is 'good' because it reduces perceptions of deviance (and thus, it is argued, reduces deviance). Moore and Tumin put it well: 'Traditional behavior depends in part upon ignorance of alternative.' 75 On the other, it was argued earlier that privacy is 'good' because it promotes deviance, the lifeblood of social change. 76 The tension might be resolved if we consider privacy to comprise both external and internal manifestations. What is not being suggested here is that blanket obedience to social norms is per se and always of social benefit, though often and selectively it will be (though nothing in this paper is offering judgement one way or another on specific norms). Its assertion is narrower. It is that privacy can contribute to both norm-reinforcement and norm-countering, each of which has the potential to be socially valuable. 77 The tension appears to be put well We saw earlier, when we considered Solove's ideas about blackmail, that protecting privacy might bring both social gains and social losses or at least there might be some ambivalence. This brings us to our last conceptualisation. To conclude this part of the article, we will turn now to another topic where, perhaps counter-intuitively, we might start to fashion a case for the social utility of privacy.
Rather inelegantly we might convey this as coalescing privacy. This was to some degree informed by the discussion that surrounded the 'unmasking' of Italian author Elena Ferrante in 2016. 87 Broadly, and in summary, this was that not only had she the right to privacy, to write anonymously, but that there was a wider interest -if not social, then of her many readers -to be able to continue reading her novels in ignorance of any personal details or backstory. This then is the idea that privacy-protection rules can contribute to public debate. First, the absence of any privileged knowledge, save that known to the person, creates a us. As Schwartz put it, a guarantee of privacy 'places restrictions on an 'outing' of knowledge and preferences that would be destructive to democratic community'. 94 There is in fact a double whammy: not only does the absence of privacy protection encourage people to make false preferences but it favours certain (usually) elite groups who might be able to drive forward the publication and thus manipulate the agenda. Privacy protection minimises the opportunities for norm entrepreneurs -in our case, likely to be media institutions -from seeking improperly to shift the contours of public debate. 95 All that said, whether or not it is of greater benefit to do so rather basing it on the absence of any information at all or only on information that we choose to release, the natural result of privacy-protecting laws, is clearly moot.
This part has identified that there are manifold ways in which it can be argued that protecting my personal privacy -specifically ensuring that information about me is not published -has instrumental value to others. We now turn to consider how far any of those wider social rationales have been played out in the case law before the domestic courts.
IV. THE ROLE AND PLACE OF 'THE SOCIAL' AND 'THE PUBLIC' IN PRIVACY DOCTRINE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
In 'Internet Privacy and the State', Paul Schwartz offers the following insight on what earlier we termed the paradigmatic conception of privacy. It is one that … conceives of privacy as a personal right to control the use of one's data.
I refer to this idea as 'privacy-control.' This liberal autonomy principle seeks to place the individual at the center of decision-making about personal information use. Privacy-control seeks to achieve informational self-determination through individual stewardship of personal data, and by keeping information isolated from access. where Hayden J said 'The challenge, in the parallel analysis of the competing rights and interests in play, is that the rights in contemplation are of wholly different complexion. The exercise involves the juxtaposition of the intensely personal (grief, loss, privacy) alongside the conceptual (the public interest, the freedom of the press, the effective dissemination of information, the administration of justice). In a jurisdiction where there is a human, and inevitable pull to the protection of the vulnerable, (this is after all the Court of Protection), it is easy to overlook how some of the wider, abstract concepts also protect society more generally and in doing so embrace the vulnerable.' I am grateful to David Acheson for making me aware of this judgment. 99 [2016] EWHC 2331 (QB). Examples of the individualistic conceptualisation of privacy abound, when we consider the sorts of harms that judges are keen to minimise or insulate against, or the good that judges seek to bring about. In Campbell, we read of the fact that protecting privacy serves to preserve personal autonomy, as well as obviating distress and the sense of betrayal. 100 There are also the therapeutic gains to at heart in JPH, 102 as well as the massive affront to dignity in T v BBC, the planned film of the last meeting between a vulnerable 18 year-old mother with an IQ of 63 (and unable to give informed consent to the filming) and her baby before the latter was taken for adoption. 103 Other general, personal health concerns feature in DMK 104 and yet more strongly the very real 'danger of serious physical and psychological harm' in Carr, where Maxine Carr was seeking to restrain publication of any post-release personal details after serving her sentence for her role in two gruesome murders of young teenage girls. 105 The driver to save or reduce embarrassment and upset, alongside security and safety concerns were to the fore in Weller 106 and saving the children from a playground ordeal and bullying in ETK. 107 Protecting an individual's fair trial rights was effected in DMK by the refusal to allow publication of information or identity when there was a separate ongoing Chancery action against her former lover. 108 Several cases have averred to the benefit that privacy brings in allowing us ordinary social interaction without also having to expect to see it reported in the press the next day. 109 Last there is the whole sub-category of intimate relations and protecting sexual choice such as as to improve, away from the media spotlight -but any adverting to wider social utility is foreclosed; it is very clearly framed in terms of individual benefit:
Participants in public sports and performing arts… reach the highest level by ascending from the lower levels. The restriction on what might otherwise be a reasonable expectation of privacy may well apply to those who aim for the highest level, even if they do not achieve it, or can no longer expect to achieve it.
116
By contrast, judicial explanations of the rationales for protecting free speech framed in both individual and social terms are many and several. We might highlight this one, again by Baroness Hale in Campbell: While explicit judicial recognition of any of the various conceptualisations of privacy-protection as having social value or utility that we considered in Part IV was broadly non-existent in our study of 27 decisions, some cases can be read as using MOPI to protect or to serve more specific (but more narrowly tailored) social goals, even if they were not so clearly reasoned. 118 Both AMM v HXW and CTB give considerable weight to the wider social interest in preventing and punishing blackmail (a matter also relevant in the granting of anonymity orders) 119 and the most obvious and sensible way to view JPH v XYZ is as preventing revenge porn. In Green Corns, there was a 'strong public interest' in the provision of secure care homes for troubled teenagers whether by the state or privately 120 -justifying the ban on a local paper printing the likely location of where new ones would be sited. We might also note that judgment reflects the social interest -in capitalist society -in commercial organisations being able to make a profit. EWHC 766 (QB) a case where an alleged blackmailer sought to disclose a businessman's adultery with, and impregnation, of X where no injunction was granted. Tugendhat J concluded that it could not be said that this disclosure about the claimant (not a public figure so far as one can tell) should not be enjoined because, even if the defendant were a blackmailer, to do so would deprive him of his Art 10 rights: ''to tell a grown up child that his or her father . . . is, or is about to be, the father of twins, is speech of a high order of importance' ([79] 
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It will unlikely surprise many but the only time there is any consideration of the wider social or public value being contested in any privacy claim comes on the other side of the coin -that of freedom of expression -at the intense focus and GreenCorns, one of our study of 27 privacy cases, we are informed that 'the principle is that the public's need to receive information is, and can only be, met through the medium of the press.' 131 The judgment of Tugendhat J in John Terry even includes a heading 'The Social Utility of the Threatened Speech'.
132
Familiar tropes here include whether or not there was a public interest in publication? What contribution will the publication make to a debate of public interest? In Ferdinand, Nicol J puts it this way
Freedom of expression applies to banal and trivial expression as well as matters of public interest, but where that right has to be balanced against the rights of others to protect their privacy, the extent to which the content is of public interest or contributes to a debate of general interest assumes a much greater importance.
Indeed, the contribution which the publication makes to a debate of general interest is the decisive factor in deciding where the balance falls between Article 8 and Article 10.
133
In Carr, for example, Eady J highlights two issues of legitimate public interest: the cost to the public purse of protecting and rehabilitating such a prisoner as Maxine
Carr on release and any future lessons for child protection. However, as he continued, there was no need for her current whereabouts or her identity to be revealed for that debate to take place. 134 Tugendhat J in Goodwin identified the public interest in '|the extent to which men in positions of power benefit from that Another theme is the public watchdog role of the press: those with the 'greatest need for this constitutionally vital freedom [of freedom of expression] are the organs of the media. In the interests of our democratic society we -and that includes the judges -must ensure that the press is freely able to enquire, investigate and report on matters of public interest.' 137 From here, of course, it is but one small step to seeking to realise the public interest in the continued existence of a viable free press by limiting those encumbrances on its ability freely to report, and thus to achieve sales. Such thinking seems now to have a firm purchase. One of Lord Woolf's guidelines in A v B & C in the Court of Appeal asserted that the courts 'must not ignore the fact that if newspapers do not publish information which the public are interested in, there will be fewer newspapers published, which will not be in the public interest'. 138 In Campbell
Lord Hoffman acknowledges that 'we value the freedom of the press but the press is a commercial enterprise and can flourish only by selling newspapers.'
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Most recently, in ETK, this was framed by Ward LJ thus:
To restrict publication simply to save the blushes of the famous, fame invariably being ephemeral, could have the wholly undesirable chilling effect on the necessary ability of publishers to sell their newspapers. We have to enable sales if we want to keep our newspapers. Unduly to fetter their freedom to report as editors judge to be responsible is to undermine the pre-eminence of the deserved place of the press as a powerful pillar of democracy.
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We might here recall that Prosser attributed as a key factor in Samuel Warren's decision to co-author that seminal piece the press intrusion into the wedding of his daughter. 141 The More recently, it was put thus by Gavin Phillipson:
if the courts are able, through development of effective privacy rights, to discourage newspapers from publishing the kind of intimate gossip with which both these cases were concerned, then the result may well be a greater concentration in the media upon serious stories, Toulson) . 166 On which, as one recent example, see P Wragg, 'Protecting private information of public interest:
That said, while re-framing privacy, in collective terms, would complicate that balancing exercise, by pairing public interest expression with of public interest privacy, we might explore this a little more before ending. 167 While, clearly, it would be impossible to prove or even quantify the social utility of preventing a particular privacy-invading publication, that should not matter. The claim that a free press contributes to democratic self-governance has never been put to proof; its truth has now simply been asserted so long and so vociferously that it is selfevident -judicial notice is simply taken of this now undisputed fact. 168 Further, it is not being asserted that all invasions of A's privacy would implicate a more collective notion of privacy. This though is, or should be true, for free speech (on the other side of the equation) -not all speech goes to enhancing democracy or offering different versions of truth in the market place for acceptance or rejection;
it is hard to see how tittle tattle can ever do so. 169 Our more socialised conception of privacy entails rejection of the monolithicism of free speech and, now, of privacy and calls for a more nuanced judicial analysis of both sides, evaluating more precisely the exact harms alleged to be suffered if the material is (not)
published. Of course, to repeat the point made above, what we dealing with on the privacy side is more likely an inchoate harm but this is likely as true of many claims made about the collective harms, or gains, of free speech.
In all this, it would be critical properly to frame the various interests at play and in tension. This might be the wider social utility or the countervailing public interest.
Tugendhat J was alert to the difficulties in GreenCorns. 170 There, the issue -to remind ourselves -was whether or not to restrain a local paper publishing certain details of a planned children's care home. He accepted that there was no public interest properly defined at all in publishing the information that was subject to restraint. 171 The public interest was in how (perhaps by whom) the children were to be cared for. That was not the material the paper sought to publish, which was the location of the home. Essentially, what was being set up in opposition, he continued, was a series of private interests in, for example, house values which the paper sought to aggregate and to be wrapped up collectively as a public interest.
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In conclusion, one matter should be made clear. This paper is not arguing that privacy should always or even invariably trump free speech: we should not always have a right to know about the love child of a leading politician. There will quite properly be times -many and frequent perhaps -as a matter both of plain doctrine and of policy and theory -when the interest in protecting someone's privacy is outweighed by the greater interest in publication, even where there might also be some consequent social or collective (future) loss if the private facts become publicly known. It is making the much simpler point. That it is time we reconceptualised privacy and its instrumental possibilities, and thus reconfigured the balancing matrix, avoiding (in footballing terms) free speech always being the team able to play at home. 
